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Summary 
In November 2010 the G-20 Seoul summit endorsed the new capital regulatory framework 
proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). This is the second major 
revision of the initial Basel Capital Accord from 1988. The proposed regulatory framework is 
announced to be implemented into national legislation by EU and European Economic Area 
(EEA) members by 2013 as a new set of directives (CRD IV). Several studies conducted by, 
among others, Macroeconomic Assessment Group of the FSB and the BCBS, the Institute of 
International Finance, OECD Economics Department and Norges Bank have evaluated the 
likely impact on the banking sector and the overall economy in general. There seems to be 
consensus on the direction of the impact in all the studies mentioned, but not on the degree. 
Economic output is mainly assumed to be affected by an increase in bank lending spreads as 
banks pass a rise in bank funding costs, arising from higher capital requirements, to their 
customers. The studies conducted by Macroeconomic Assessment Group and OECD 
Economics Department estimate that banks will increase their lending spreads on average by 
about 15 basis points in order to meet the capital requirements effective in 2015.  
 The aim of this thesis is to investigate the medium term economic impact of the new 
capital regulatory standards (the Basel III reform) for Norway using a standard semi-structural 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with credit market imperfections. The 
following questions are answered: (i) what are the major expected effects of higher minimum 
capital requirement on the Norwegian banking sector and on medium-term economic 
performance? (ii) How is the inclusion of a proposed countercyclical capital buffer, when 
made dependent on either the credit-to-GDP or the real credit growth as common reference 
point, affecting the model economy and in particular GDP and credit growth?  
 The main findings of this study are the following: (1) each percentage point increase in 
the capital adequacy ratio translates into a 0.50 per cent loss in the level of steady state output. 
The long-run effect of a persistent shock to the capital adequacy ratio equation propagates 
through the banking sector block in the model to the real sector, affecting output by as much 
as -0.55 percentage points at its peak before shifting output to a new steady-state level 
between 0.50 and 0.55 percentage below its initial level. (2) The application of a 
countercyclical capital buffer based on a prudential rule that increases the capital requirement 
when the credit-to-GDP ratio rises seems capable of moderating credit growth in the model, 
but it increases the output volatility. More up to date findings in the literature suggest that the 
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use of credit-to-GDP gap as a common reference point could be flawed and at worst increase 
the inherent pro-cyclicality of bank capital regulation. Reproducing the same methods to 
investigate this issue for Norway seems to confirm this undesirable property. Findings from 
the estimated model suggest that the use of a buffer, with credit-to-GDP gap as a reference 
point alters the sign of the correlation between output growth and bank capital, producing a 
strong negative correlation of -0.61. In order to circumvent this issue, real credit growth is 
employed as an alternative indicator. The use of real credit growth, both as a leading indicator 
of systemic risk and as a common reference point, seems to moderate credit growth in a 
sizeable way and output growth to some extent. Finally, the model seems to generate a 
slightly higher correlation between output and bank capital, confirming that the use of real 
credit growth, next to having some desirable properties, also seems able to produce results in 
the model economy that are closely in line with the main objectives of Basel III and its 
mandate.    
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1 Introduction  
In December 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a 
consultative document outlining proposals for strengthening regulations of banks’ capital and 
liquidity following the lessons learned from the US financial turmoil (“Strengthening the 
resilience of the banking sector”, Bank for International Settlements, December 2009). The 
proposed set of regulations, also known as Basel III, is the second major revision of the initial 
Basel Accord of 1988 which is a set of standards for harmonizing solvency regulations for 
internationally active banks of the G-10 countries. The proposal was endorsed in late 
November 2010 by the G20 Seoul Summit and is likely to be implemented by the EU and the 
European Economic Area (EEA) members by 2013 as a new set of directives (CRD IV).
1
 Several studies have been conducted in order to quantify the likely impact and 
consequence the new set of regulations will have on bank’s lending spreads, as well as the 
macroeconomic impact on aggregate credit and output. In August 2010, the Basel Committee 
and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued two reports assessing the impact of Basel III. 
These followed the publication of estimates of this impact by other bodies, including one by 
the Institute of International Finance (IIF), an industry body of international banks.  
 One of the two official reports of the Macroeconomic Assessment Group of the FSB 
and the BCBS (referred to as the MAG report in what follows) is concerned with the impact 
during the transition period when the new requirements for capital and liquidity are being 
phased in and focuses exclusively on the costs of introducing the new requirements.
2
 The 
other report of a working group of the BCBS analyzes the long-term economic impact of 
Basel III.
3
 “Long-term” is defined by the assumption that banks have completed the transition 
to the new regulations on capital and liquidity. This report assesses the economic benefit as 
well as the costs of regulations.        
 The MAG report’s estimates of the deviations of output from baseline in the 
eighteenth quarter after the implementation of increased capital requirements are modest. For 
a one per cent increase in the capital ratio using a transition period of four years, the median 
                                                 
 
1
 "CRD IV" (Capital Requirements Directive), is based on the new framework (Basel III) proposed by BCBS 
and is expected to be implemented by January 2013. In Norway the CRD IV will apply for all Banks and 
financial institutions.  
2
 "Assessing the macroeconomic impact of the transition to stronger capital and liquidity requirements", Interim 
Report, Bank for International Settlements, August 2010. 
3
 "An Assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements,” Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, August 2010.  
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estimate is a decrease of output of about 0.15 per cent. The result shows that an increase in the 
capital ratio by two per cent translates into a decrease of output of 0.30 per cent.   
 The report on the assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital and 
liquidity requirements presents a range of estimates of costs and benefits according to 
different levels of the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA) and according to whether 
or not the capital rules are accompanied by additional requirements for liquidity. A one per 
cent increase in the capital ratio is associated with a 0.09 per cent annual reduction of GDP 
without additional liquidity requirements, and with a 0.17 per cent reduction of GDP if 
coupled with additional liquidity requirements.      
 For the IIF report, the cumulative difference during the period 2011-2015 between 
GDP in the scenario incorporating regulatory change and the baseline scenario is 3.1 per cent. 
This figure corresponds to annual average difference of 0.6 per cent.
4
   
 A study published by Slovik and Cournède (2011) at the OECD Economics 
Department argues that “to meet the Basel III requirements effective as of 2015 banks would 
increase their lending spreads on average by approximately 15 basis points. To meet the Basel 
III requirements effective as of 2019 banks would increase their lending spreads on average 
by approximately 50 basis points”. In the three main OECD economies, a one percentage 
point increase in the ratio of bank capital to risk weighted assets would result in an average 
impact on GDP level of −0.20 per cent, five years after the implementation, which translates 
into a −0.04 percentage point impact on annual GDP growth.    
 A further impact study conducted by researchers at Norges Bank with the title 
“Macroeconomic impact of higher capital requirements for banks,” analyzes the likely impact 
on the Norwegian economy using an estimated structural vector auto regression (VAR) 
model.
5
 The paper studies the impact of a permanent increase of one percentage point in the 
core minimum capital requirement on the baseline credit and output gap levels.  Since there 
are some uncertainties as to when the banks will choose to raise their capital adequacy ratio 
the baseline scenario used range from 2, 4 and 8 quarters. Predictably the results show that the 
effects are strongest for the two quarters phase in period, peaking after 2-3years with credit-
supply contracting by 3 per cent and the GDP growth deviating from baseline trend by 1.25 
per cent, the effect wears out after three years. The mean reversion back to pre-shock levels in 
                                                 
 
4
 IIF, "The Net Cumulative Economic Impact of Banking Sector Regulation: Some New Perspectives", October 
2010.  
5
 “Makroøkonomiske virkninger av høyere kapitalkrav for bankene” Staff Memo 14/2011, Norges Bank. 
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their model is largely due to monetary policy easing (Jacobsen et al, 2011).   
 The principal objective of this paper is using an estimated open economy dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for Norway with credit market imperfections to 
(i) evaluate the major expected effects of Basel III’s proposal to increase minimum capital 
requirement on the Norwegian banking sector and the subsequent macroeconomic impact on 
medium-term economic performance, and (ii) to evaluate the impact of a new feature 
proposed by Basel III, i.e. the countercyclical capital buffer, on economic fluctuations. It is 
worth emphasizing that the focus of the paper is on the costs of the new regulations, as the 
methodology used is not intended to capture the benefits. Once the model structure is readily 
set up, the parameters of the model are estimated by means of Bayesian estimation to 
incorporate stylized facts along with judgments and the information from the data.  
 In general this thesis makes two innovative contributions. First, the paper analyzes the 
Basel III regulation through the lenses of a semi-structural model for Norway. The core of the 
model is a “reduced form” New Keynesian DSGE model while the banking sector is specified 
using an econometric approach for reasons explained later in the text. As far as I know, this is 
the first attempt of this kind. Previous studies for Norway are based on a pure econometric 
model, as in Jacobsen et al. (2011). Second, the introduction of a countercyclical capital 
buffer by Basel III has not previously been analyzed in a macroeconomic model, and as such, 
the conceptualizing and modeling of a countercyclical capital buffer for a structural model 
economy of Norway is, to my knowledge, first explored and attempted in this paper. 
 The main results of this study are the following: (1) each percentage point increase in 
the capital adequacy ratio translates into a 0.50 per cent loss in the level of steady state output. 
The long-run effect of a persistent shock to the capital adequacy ratio equation propagates 
through the banking sector block in the model to the real sector, affecting output by as much 
as -0.55 percentage points at its peak before shifting output to a new steady-state level in the 
range of 0.50 and 0.55 percentage below its initial level. (2) A prudential rule that increases 
the capital requirement when the credit-to-output gap rises seems capable of moderating 
credit growth. However, as argued by Repullo and Saurina (2010), the use of credit-to-GDP 
deviation from steady state as a “common reference point” for taking buffer decisions may 
end up exacerbating the inherent pro-cyclicality of risk-sensitive bank capital due to a 
discernible negative correlation between credit-to-GDP gap and output growth. This issue can 
be tackled, as they argue further, by the use of real credit growth, which is positively 
correlated with output growth, as a common reference point instead. Using real credit growth, 
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I was, in addition to moderating excessive credit growth, also able to reduce output volatility 
in a sizeable way able. Moreover the results confirm, by generating a positive correlation of 
0.22 between output growth and bank capital, that the use of real credit growth is better suited 
for mitigating pro-cyclicality in the model.        
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the experience from the 
financial crisis which started in 2008 followed by a summary of the Basel Accords and the 
latest proposals for Basel III. Section 3 develops a baseline DSGE model for Norway that 
incorporates financial intermediation. Section 4 will provide an overview of the statistical 
methodology, data series, and validation of model fit, prior distributions and calibrated 
parameters. Section 5 discusses the different effects on and responses of the endogenous 
variables and shows the impulse responses from two different shocks; a monetary policy 
shock and a shock originating from banks’ capital adequacy ratios. Section 6 considers the 
use of a countercyclical capital buffer as a tool for mitigating pro-cyclicality and the build-up 
of systemic-wide-risk, followed by a discussion on the use of credit-to-GDP gap as a common 
reference point for making decisions on the build-up and release of the buffer.  Lastly, Section 
7 provides some conclusions. 
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2 Regulatory Reform and Capital Requirements 
In the summer of 2007 the US economy was severally hit by the sudden burst of the housing 
bubble. The resulting decline in real estate prices and the subsequent increase in banks 
lending spreads led many households to default on their mortgages, forcing many large and 
reputable banks to write down substantial portions of their loan portfolios. The drop in asset 
prices eroded the capital positions of the financial institutions, who, in turn, responded by 
tightening lending standards and increasing margins further. Both effects tightened the 
volume of lending and pushed prices further down, exacerbating the “liquidity spiral”. 
(Brunnermeier, 2009).          
 According to Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) severe financial crises rarely occur in 
isolation. In addition to triggering a likely recession, they often amplify “the reversal of 
fortunes” i.e. lower output growth leads to more defaults on bank loans, which in turn force a 
pullback in other bank lending, exacerbating the ongoing economic slowdown and repayment 
problems and so on.
6
 This interconnected link between the banking sector and the real 
economy was described by Fisher (1933), with his understanding of a debt-deflation process 
playing a central role in the propagation of cyclical fluctuations and by the workings of 
Bernanke (1983) and more recently in a formalized model on the “financial accelerator” by 
Bernanke et al. (1999).         
 Clearly the magnitude of this amplification mechanism is determined by the 
macroeconomic environment. Banks with ever increasing proportions of non-performing 
loans and loan losses face a depletion of bank capital and a reduction in their internal buffers. 
The US financial turmoil revealed that certain Tier 1 capital instruments – classified as core 
capital – were unable to absorb losses. Consequently new macro-prudential regulations were 
called for, and in December 2010 new rules on capital and liquidity were negotiated and 
finally agreed upon through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The agreement, 
known as “Basel III”, has tightened its definitions of regulatory capital. Tier 1 capital will 
now be comprised predominantly of common shares and retained earnings. The introduction 
of these new regulatory requirements will have a large effect on the world’s financial systems 
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 It is also reasonable to assume that a leakage of bad performance of bank loan portfolios could trigger a 
fundamental bank run i.e. when depositors learn bad news about their bank, they could fear bankruptcy and 
respond by withdrawing their deposits (Freixas and Rochet, 2009: 230).  
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and economies. The main aim is to make the national financial systems, as well as the global 
financial system, more robust and safer (BCBS, 2009a).  
2.1 The Basel Capital Accords and Basel III Proposals 
The failure of the small German bank (Herstatt) on June 26, 1974, sent shockwaves through 
the global financial system due to poor coordination among national regulators. The G-10 
countries responded to this “Herstatt debacle” by forming a standing committee under the 
affiliation of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) called the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS). The Committee is composed of representatives from central 
banks and regulatory authorities. In 1988, the Committee introduced a capital measurement 
system referred to as the Basel Capital Accord also known as Basel I. The Basel accords are 
not formal treaties and the conclusions of BCBS are not always fully implemented in detail 
into national law and regulation by its member states. In any event, the accord has led to 
greater uniformity of capital requirements globally since it formulates supervisory standards 
and guidelines and recommends statements of best practice. Basel I considered only credit 
risk. It required international banks from the G-10 countries to hold a minimum total capital 
equal to 8 percent of risk-adjusted assets, with at least half of this met by tier 1 capital (equity 
capital and disclosed reserves). Tier 2 Capital could include, among other instruments, hybrid 
debt capital instruments (BCBS, 2009).        
 The Basel II revisions made changes to the risk-weighted asset calculations and placed 
greater emphasis on proactive supervision and market discipline. The revisions are commonly 
referred to as the three pillars of Basel II. The four major changes where: (1) the introduction 
of more detailed risk-categories, (2) greater reliance on external ratings from the major credit 
rating agencies (3) use of internal risk rating models, and (4) a different method was 
introduced to calculate the risk of assets that were held in trading accounts. Thus a “Value at 
Risk” (VaR) approach was used. The recent financial crisis exposed a number of areas of 
weakness in the Basel II rules. This led to a call for a new framework for bank capital and 
liquidity.            
 Basel III extends the three pillars of Basel II and requires banks to hold 4.5 per cent of 
common equity and 6 per cent of Tier 1 capital of risk-weighted assets (RWA).
 7
 In addition, 
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 Main features are described in Caruana (2010). 
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to the core-capital requirements, Basel III also introduces capital buffers, (i) a mandatory 
capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent and (ii) a discretionary countercyclical capital 
buffer, which allows national regulators to require up to another 2.5 per cent of capital during 
periods of high credit growth.
 8
 In addition, Basel III introduces a minimum 3 per cent 
leverage ratio and two required liquidity ratios. The liquidity coverage ratio requires a bank to 
hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover its total net cash flows over 30 days; the Net 
Stable Funding ratio requires the available amount of stable funding to exceed the required 
amount of stable funding over a one-year period of extended stress (BCBS, 2009a). The 
additional liquidity regulation is also conceived to have a major effect. This effect has been 
studied using a separate model and is also accounted for in the MAG report. In the remainder 
of the paper the focus will lay solely on capital regulation, thus, the effect of liquidity 
regulation is ignored.          
 While it is agreeable that having too little capital in the system may leave it crisis 
prone and in need of regular bailouts, forcing banks to have higher capital cushions, on the 
other hand, could have adverse effects (e.g. higher borrowing costs and lower economic 
growth).
 9
 It is therefore conceivable that Basel III could inadvertently be ill-suited by several 
(possibly concurring) factors and the framework set in motion can as a result involve costs 
that exceed their expected benefits. Since the new set of regulations can affect economic 
performance and give rise to conflicting effects through multiple channels, the impact is 
closely studied using a stylized DSGE model for the Norwegian economy. The descriptions as 
well as the use of the model are the topic of next section. 
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 Proposed Basel III norms ask for ratios as: 7- 9.5% (4.5% + 2.5% (conservation buffer) + 0-2.5% (seasonal 
buffer)) for common equity and 8.5% to 11% for Tier 1 capital and 10.5% to 13% for total capital (BCBS, 
2009a). 
9
 See Santos (2001b) for a review of the justifications for bank capital regulation in contemporary banking 
theory. 
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3 The Model 
The baseline framework used in this paper is a semi-structural small new Keynesian open 
economy model with imperfect competition. The model is composed of three sectors as 
shown in figure 1. (1) A core part describing the relationship between main macroeconomic 
aggregates for the Norwegian economy. (2) An open economy sector, captured using three 
variables describing the Euro Area (EA) (Assumed to represent the “rest of the world”), 
namely EA inflation, EA nominal interest rate and EA output gap. All the EA variables are 
treated as exogenous to the core model. (3) A macroeconometric banking sector block is used 
to incorporate financial intermediation into the model. The structure of the core and the open 
economy sector of the model are very similar in terms of equations to those in Sidaoui and 
Ramos-Francis (2008). The choice of the framework provided by their paper is due to a 
convenient set-up by the author of the standard new Keynesian open economy model that, in 
addition to capturing the main macroeconomic features of the Norwegian economy well, 
proves suitable for the incorporation of a macroeconometric banking sector block. The use of 
a macroeconometric banking block, which is heavily influenced by Peñaloza (2011), is a 
symptom of the lack of a simple, but still fully, micro-founded model for banking behavior. 
The framework used by Peñaloza (2011) provides an alternative perspective that includes 
costs of default and positive lending spreads; a feature that is essential to account for credit 
market imperfections and to study the potential amplifying role of financial factors on 
macroeconomic developments. In fact, the presence of lending spreads as endogenous 
variables in the model is an essential feature that allows me to conduct my analysis and to 
evaluate the expected reaction of the banking sector. A crucial assumption made is that the 
banks pass their increased costs to their customers through higher spreads. This in turns 
explains the negative impact on output of higher minimum capital requirements.  Further, the 
model is in a reduced form. This means that although the structure of the equations are in line 
with those derived in the context of a fully fledge New Keynesian DSGE model (preserving 
some specific features and theoretical explanations at the basis of their final version, like for 
instance the rational expectations assumption and the presences of habit formation in 
consumption, and price indexations among others), combinations of structural parameters that 
would appear in the equations as the results of the solution of the agents’ maximization 
problems will be treated as unique parameters. This is a shortcut justified by the fact that this 
simplifies the estimation procedure (reducing the number of parameters to be estimated) and 
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by the fact that the aim is to get an estimated model which captures the dynamics of the 
Norwegian macroeconomic variables rather than a point estimate of the structural 
parameters.
10
 This strategy will also be helpful in selecting prior means for the parameters. 
 
Figure.1: The Model
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 This is done in Brubakk (2006). 
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3.1 The Core of the Model 
In this section I will present the core model of the Norwegian economy. This is a similar 
model to the one used by Peñaloza (2011) with some minor differences that will be further 
explained. The core of the model is as mentioned a semi-structural small open economy new 
Keynesian DSGE model and is structured in the following manner:   
 The core model is structured as follows:  
1. An IS curve for the output gap. 
2. An Augmented Phillips curve for price inflation. 
3. An equation for real-exchange rate dynamics. 
4. Imported inflation (CPI). 
5. A monetary policy rule. 
 
The IS-equation outlined below links the evolution of aggregate demand (output gap) to the 
real-interest rate, foreign output gap and the real exchange rate. 
 
  =        +                 +     
  +     +   
  
 
(1) 
where    is the output gap, defined as the current level of output relative to its steady-state 
level (its mean in the data),        –    [      is the real interest rate (with    [      being 
the expected gross CPI inflation rate and    the short term nominal interest rate),    is the real 
exchange rate,   
   is the Euro Area output gap.
12
 The disturbance term   
  follows an AR(1) 
process    
          
     
  , where the autocorrelation coefficient     is between 0 and 1 
in absolute value, with i.i.d. errors   
          
  .13 The parameters   ,   ,   ,   , and    
will be restricted to be positive in the estimation process and the signs to capture the 
relationships among varaibles are set into the equations appropriately.
14
  The formulation of 
equation (1), also known as the Euler equation, reflects the forward-looking nature of the 
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 The real-interest rate (i.e. purchasing power repaid over purchasing power lent) is the standard Fisher identity. 
13
 The specification of the exogenous shock processes as following an independent AR(1) process is very much 
in line with other studies found in the literature for estimated DSGE models (Schorfheide, 2010) 
14
 This is true for all the parameters in all equations. 
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agents as well as the presence of habit in their consumption pattern. As Norway is a small 
open economy, the real exchange rate     can affect the level of economic activity through the 
prices of imports and exports, while Euro area output gap    
   is an important determinant of 
export demand. The demand disturbance   
  can arise from a taste shock to the preferences of 
the representative household.         
 Now, turning to the supply side of the model, an equation for domestic inflation is 
presented. The equation bears a resemblance to the so called new Keynesian Phillips curve. 
The difference is due to open economy features captured by the incorporation of exchange 
rate and foreign inflation and is defined as the following: 
 
  
  =       
  +          
   +      +   [   +   
    +   
   
 
(2) 
Where   
  denote domestic inflation and    is the output gap. The difference operator     in 
the equation is used to capture changes in the nominal exchange rate, and   
   takes into 
account movements in the Euro area inflation.
15
 The disturbance term   
  represents a cost 
push shock. The disturbance term follows an AR(1) process   
          
      
 , where 
          and   
         
  .  Parameter    characterizes the endogenous persistence of 
inflation, while    allows forward-looking behavior by firms and households to affect the 
inflation process, and    captures the short-run tradeoff between inflation and the output gap. 
The parameter    represents the pass-through of the nominal exchange rate and EA inflation 
to domestic inflation. Equation (2) implies that the inflation process is forward-looking, in 
which current inflation is a function of expected future inflation.
16
 It equally follows the 
indexation to the past value of inflation (or wages). The main determinant driving the 
inflation process is the output gap. This is in line with the more detailed specification often 
found in a fully fledge DSGE model where the real marginal cost is derived to be the correct 
driving variable for the inflation process and prices are set as mark-ups over marginal costs 
subject to limited probability of re-setting prices in each period.
17
 The two formulations 
                                                 
 
15
 Summaries the long sentence below. 
16
 Inflation can be shown to be a function of the present discounted value of current and future real marginal 
costs (Walsh, 2010: 336). 
17
 The model of price stickiness is taken from Calvo (1983). He assumed that firms adjust their prices 
infrequently, and that opportunities to adjust arrive as an exogenous Poisson process. Individual firms produce 
differentiated products, they all have the same production technology and face demand curves with constant and 
equal demand elasticity. 
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equivalently capture the positive relationship between real economic activity and inflation.
 Further, since the term for change in the nominal exchange rate is included in equation 
(2) I will without further due define and explain the mechanism behind this variable. The 
change in the nominal exchange rate is given by: 
 
         +   
     
 
 
 
 
Where     is the change in the nominal exchange rate,     is change in the real-exchange 
rate, while   
  is the domestic inflation as described by equation (2) and   
 
represent imported 
inflation as defined in equation (3). According to the equation depicted above the percentage 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is equal to the real exchange rate depreciation plus 
the inflation differential between the domestic and the foreign economy. This implies that a 
decrease in the relative price of foreign goods gives rise to a nominal exchange rate 
appreciation.  
 The third component making up the structure of the core model is the real-exchange 
rate. Equation (3) below is the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity condition (UIRP), where   
    
captures the EA real-interest rate and    the domestic real-interest rate. It implies that the 
home country real interest rate will exceed the foreign real rate if the home country is 
expected to experience a real depreciation. Real exchange rate depreciation reduces home 
aggregate supply by raising the price of imported goods and by raising consumer prices 
relative to producer prices.   
 
  =        +             +(  
   –     +   
 
 
 
(3) 
  
 
Under flexible exchange rates a fall in the domestic rate of inflation boosts aggregate demand 
through three effects. First, it makes domestically produced goods less expensive relative to 
foreign goods and shifts demand away from foreign output and toward home output. Second, 
it induces the central bank to reduce the interest rate, thereby stimulating investment and 
consumption. However, the somewhat reduced policy rate has a dampening effect on the real 
interest rate, so the initial effect is at best short lived. Third, the lower interest rate causes a 
depreciation which gives a further stimulus to net exports. The disturbance term    
 
 is a 
shock to the real-exchange rate that follows an AR(1) process   
         
     
 , where 
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         and   
         
  . The change in the real-exchange rate is defined as the 
following        –      .         
 The fourth component of the core model is the equation for imported inflation. As in 
Adolfsen et al. (2007a) the households in this open economy model consume a basket 
consisting of both domestically produced goods and imported goods, assuming that these 
products are supplied by domestic and importing firms, respectively. A separate equation is 
included to capture imported inflation and is given by: 
 
  
         
     
 
 
 
(4) 
Where   
 
 represents imported inflation and   
  denote the associated disturbance term. 
The   
  is a cost push shock to inflation that follows an AR(1) process   
          
  
   
  ,where           and   
        
  
 
  . In particular, exporting and importing firms in 
the model operate by selling differentiated consumption goods to foreign and domestic 
markets subject to the local currency price stickiness and indexation to past inflation   
 Finally, to sum up the inflation dynamics in the model CPI inflation is assumed to be a 
weighted average of domestic inflation and imported inflation (Adolfsen).  The dynamics of 
core inflation are described by the New-Keynesian Phillips curve provided by equation (2) 
above, while imported inflation is given by equation (4). 
 
  =     
  +    
 
 +   
  
 
 
 
Where    represents overall inflation composed of domestic inflation (  
   and foreign 
inflation (  
  . The parameters    and    are different weights ascribed to the two different 
sources for inflation.
18
 The disturbance term   
  is a measurement error term that follows an 
AR(1) process   
          
     
  , where           and   
        
  
 
  . This error 
term is included to circumvent the issue of the so called errors-in-variables problem.
19
 Lastly, an equation for the monetary policy rule is presented. The behavior of the 
                                                 
 
18
 To see a DSGE based derivation of equation (4), see Adolfsen et al. (2007). The weights    and    are 
functions of the structural parameters like for instance, among others, the share of the importing consumption 
and for this reason they do not necessarily sum up to one.   
19
 The errors-in-variables problem is concerned with the implication of using incorrectly measured variables. 
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central bank is approximated with an instrument rule, more specifically a modified Taylor 
rule. Following Smets and Wouters (2003a), the policy maker is assumed to adjust the short 
term nominal interest rate in response to deviations of CPI inflation and output deviations 
from steady-state.  This adjustment process is defined as the following: 
 
  = (1-             +       +        +  
          
 
 
(5) 
The parameter    measures the response of the Central bank to inflation, while    describes 
its reaction to output gap fluctuations. Since    is bigger than 0 in the estimation, the 
expression        is included in order to respect the Taylor principle. The lagged interest 
rate features interest rate smoothing, as is evident from practice.
 20
 The monetary policy shock 
is described by the disturbance term   
  that follows an AR(1) process   
         
     
  , 
where           and   
        
  
 
  .  Although the monetary policy shock might be 
perceived by some authors as white noise, recent estimations of DSGE model as in Smets and 
Wouters (2007) show that an autoregressive structure for this shock is not an unreasonable 
assumption. The estimated auto correlated coefficient is found to be positive, but reasonably 
low. My findings are in line with this study.  
 
3.2 The foreign sector of the model  
The euro area part of the model is subject to its own set of structural shocks that are designed 
to reproduce the monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank, and to act as a 
foreign market for Norwegian exports and imports. Specification outlined for the EA 
variables are for the sake of convenience exogenously given and follows an AR (1) process. 
This allows for a more flexible representation of the reduced form dynamics of these 
variables.            
 As a consequence the Euro area inflation will be described by the following equation: 
                                                 
 
20
 A modified Taylor rule which includes the lagged interest rate on the right-hand side comes close to being 
optimal, according to Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). 
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(6) 
Where   
   is the euro area inflation and      is the autoregressive coefficient restricted 
between 0 and 1. Finally,   
    is a disturbance term that is itself a function of an AR(1) 
process   
     
  
      
       
 , where  
  
         and the error term is   
         
  .
 Secondly, Euro area output-gap is also described as an AR(1) process and is given by: 
 
  
           
      
    
 
 
(7) 
Where   
   is the euro area inflation.   
    is a disturbance term that follows an AR(1) process  
  
     
  
      
       
 , where  
  
         and   
         
  .   
 And lastly, the Euro area real-interest rate is described as following an independent 
AR(1) process and is outlined below as: 
AR (1) process 
  
           
      
     
 
 
(8) 
Where   
   is the euro area real-interest rate.    
    is a disturbance term that follows an AR(1) 
process   
     
  
      
       
 , where  
  
         and   
         
  . The nominal 
interest rate is given by the fisher equation,   
   =  
          
   , and is set by the European 
Central Bank for the euro area. Where   
   is the nominal interest rate,   
   is the real interest 
rate for the euro area and       
    represents the expected inflation rate for the euro area one 
period ahead. 
3.3 The Banking Sector 
In this section I adopt a macroeconometric approach as in Peñaloza (2011) in order to 
incorporate financial intermediation into the core model for the reasons explained above. 
Despite this specification of the banking sector block, many of the features of the banking 
model implied by, among others, Gertler and Kyotaki (2010) are implicitly assumed to be 
inherent. One such inherent property is credit market imperfection and the subsequent 
“financial accelerator” it gives rise to, as argued by Bernanke et al. (1999). Motivated by a 
16 
 
stylized “balance sheet” for Norwegian banks, banking activity is predominantly modeled as 
the production of deposit and loan services and the banking technology is assumed to reflect 
the cost of managing a volume of equity and deposits (both retail and wholesale), and a 
volume of loans; making loans to non-financial corporations and issuing credit to 
mortgages.
21
 Applying this framework allows us to study the effect of an increase in the 
minimum capital requirement, i.e. reducing the leverage, on banks’ lending spreads as well as 
the volume of lending, assuming that the increase in funding cost is passed on to borrowers. 
Lending spreads are within this framework dependent on banks’ delinquency indexes and 
capital. The rationale behind the use of delinquency indexes is, as pointed out by Peñaloza 
(2011), “an assumption that banks increase their lending spreads when they face higher 
delinquency indexes and when they increase their equity ratio so as to keep their return on 
equity (ROE) roughly constant.” Delinquency indexes are specified as a function of their 
lagged values and the output gap. The relationship between delinquency indexes and the 
output gap allows for a feedback from the core-model to the banking sector block. The 
aggregate credit in circulation is modeled so as to react positively to changes in the output gap 
and negatively to lending spreads.        
 The banking sector block consists of a set of equations that are linked to each other 
and to the core model. The building blocks of the banking sector are as following: 
9. A modified IS equation that incorporates lending spreads. 
10. Equations for lending spreads by sector. 
11. Equations for delinquency indexes by sector. 
12. Equation for a credit by sector. 
13. A “rule” for the capital adequacy ratio. 
 
A Modified IS Equation is included in order to capture spill-over effects from the banking 
sector to the real economy, the IS-equation (9) below have been modified to include lending 
spreads (       ). The mechanism is, as argued by Peñaloza (2011), “in line with some of 
the work done in Macroeconomic-Assessment-Group (2010a).” The modified IS-equation is 
defined as the following: 
                                                 
 
21
 Banks raise funds in a national financial market. Within the national financial market, there is a retail market, 
where banks obtain deposits from households; and a wholesale market, where banks borrows and lend amongst 
one and another (Gertler & Kyotaki (2010)). 
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  =        +                 +     
  +                +      
 
 
(9) 
Where the components in the equation are defined exactly in the same way as for equation (1) 
with the exception of the term         which denotes the aggregate lending spread. The 
construction of the lending spreads is explained more thoroughly below. The idea behind the 
use is that lending spreads can affect the output gap by affecting aggregate demand (An 
increase in the overall lending spread will induce households and non-financial corporations 
to cut back on spending), thus, an increase (decrease) in lending spreads will have a negative 
(positive) effect on the output gap.         
 The second component of the banking block is the equation for aggregate sectorial 
lending spreads. The regulatory impact on bank lending spreads is estimated based on 
accounting identities applied to aggregated banking sector lending spreads. The equations 
below utilize sector specific delinquency indexes combined with a banking system equity 
ratio (capital/risk-weighted assets) to capture sectorial lending spreads.  
 
       
 
=    
          
 
+   
       
 
 + +  
 
     +            
 
 
(10) 
The lending spread is defined for both non-financial corporations and for mortgages so that j= 
{corp, mort}, and       
 
  is the delinquency index in sector j and      is the capital adequacy 
ratio of the banking sector. The disturbance term            follows an AR(1) process 
  
         
       
     
           
       
 
, where  
       
        and   
       
  
       
  .   
 Next, we turn to the third component, namely the delinquency indexes. The idea 
behind this construct is that delinquency indexes are low (high) when economic activity is 
high (low), reflecting an inverse relationship –as evident by empirical findings- between the 
debt-servicing capacity of borrowers (i.e. non-financial corporations and households) and the 
output gap. This relationship is defined as the following: 
 
      
 
=   
         
    
 
   +           
 
 
(11) 
Where       
 
 are the sectorial specific delinquency indexes, j= {corp, mort}. The 
parameter  
 
 with a negative sign in front, capture the notion that delinquency indexes follow 
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developments in the output gap. The disturbance term           follows an independent AR(1) 
process   
        
      
     
          
      
 
where  
      
        and the error term is 
  
      
 
      
  
      
  .         
 Next in line is the construction of the sectorial demand for credit. The following 
equation specifies demand for credit of each type (i.e. credit volume by sector). The central 
tenet behind the use is that aggregate credit in circulation is driven by demand. Aggregate 
demand for credit, or in our case sectorial demand, is high and increasing when the economy 
is booming (i.e. during an expansion) and low and decreasing during a recession reflected by 
an ever increasing output gap. A second component affecting demand for credit is lending 
spreads. As lending spreads increase so does the cost of credit and the demand goes down. In 
the opposite case when lending spreads are low and falling, credit becomes cheap, or less 
costly, and the demand for it goes up. Keeping in line with this intuition credit allocations is 
given by:
22
   
 
   
 
=   
      
    
        
 
 +   
 
   +        
 
 
(12) 
Where    
 
 is the demand for credit, j= {corp, mort}.The disturbance term   
   
 
 follows an 
independent AR(1) process    
     
   
     
       
   
 
where  
   
        and the error term 
is   
   
 
      
  
   
  .         
 Before moving into a discussion about the last component of the banking block some 
identities and definitions are defined and presented.      
 Aggregate delinquency is defined as the following:   
 
                   
    
 +                
        
      
 
 
 
                                                 
 
22
 As noted by Peñaloza (2011) the structure of the model so far places sectorial credit gaps as residual variables. 
It is only when they enter the reaction functions of the regulatory authorities (CAR rule) that they affect lending 
spreads, and consequently output. This feature is made clear in figure.1 above.  
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Where        denotes aggregate delinquency, while       
 
 represents sector specific 
delinquency indexes. Each of them are given a different weight denoted by      . The 
disturbance term   
      is a measurement error term that follows an AR(1) process   
      
           
         
       where               and   
            
  
     
  .   
 Aggregate lending spreads is given by:  
 
                     
    
 +                 
        
      
 
 
Where         denote aggregate lending spreads, while        
 
 represents sector specific 
lending spreads. Each of them are given a different weight denoted by       and          . 
The disturbance term   
      
  follows an AR(1) process   
                   
       
   
        where                and   
             
  
      
  .     
 And lastly, aggregate credit is defined as the following: 
 
             
    
 +             
        
      
 
Where     denote aggregate credit, while        
 
 represents the share of credit accrued to the 
two different sectors. Each of them are given a different weight denoted by       and 
         . The disturbance term   
       follows an AR(1) process   
       
   
       
      
   
   
   
 where  
   
          and   
   
   
      
  
     
  .     
 Finally, a credit-to-GDP gap is defined. This is a variable that will be used to a great 
extent in section 6. As for now a simple formulation is in place and is defined as the 
following: 
 
          
 
 
In the following, two different equations impacting banks’ equity ratios are presented. 
These equations reproduce the two dimensions to capital’s role as argued by Disyatat 
20 
 
(2010).
23
 First out is an equation for the baseline capital adequacy ratio. This specification 
attempts to capture in the simplest possible way the evolution of commercial banks’ (at an 
aggregate level) capital adequacy ratios and is defined as: 
 
     =                 
          
 
(13) 
Where      denote the baseline capital adequacy ratio, while     
  is the externally imposed 
regulatory requirement. In equation (35)    is a switching parameter that is equal to 1 if there 
is regulation in place and equal to 0 otherwise. Given that the regulation has not been in place 
in the past, data would not have been informative to estimate this parameter. This is the 
reason why I don’t estimate it and I allow it to be a binary variable. Lastly, an error term is 
included. This error term        follows an AR(1) process   
             
       
    where 
            and   
          
  
   
  .         
 The capital adequacy ratio rule is on the other hand specified only in terms of the 
countercyclical capital buffer. A detailed specification is provided in section 6, along with the 
use of two different indicators for making buffer decisions.  
 
    
  =     
 
(14) 
3.4 Measurement Equations 
In this section I explain how I bring the model to the data. I follow two different strategies. 
First, I will use a series of measurement equations and secondly I will use some identities. 
With respect to the former I present the following measurement equations. I will use growth 
rates of some variables as observables in the estimation process and given that some other 
observables do not appear as endogenous variables in the model I need to provide a series of 
measurement equations and definitions to create the link between the statistical definitions of 
                                                 
 
23“From the perspective of banks’ creditors, the amount of capital signifies the extent to which any losses will be 
cushioned which, in turn, influences the rate at which they are willing to lend to banks, and second, from the 
banks’ perspective, the presence of regulatory capital requirements acts like a hard constraint on asset 
expansion” (Disyatat, 2010).  
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those variables and their theoretical definitions inside the model.    
 Starting with growth rates I define the output gap growth rate as:  
 
                     
 
 
The measurement used for GDP growth for Norway is the quarter-on-quarter growth and is 
defined as the following. Where           denote the quarter-on-quarter GDP growth for 
Norway, while     and       captures the current and previous GDP rates, respectively. 
 The measurement employed for the growth of credit to non-financial corporations’ is 
the quarter-on-quarter data for credit growth and is defined as: 
 
          
         
          
    
 
 
 
Where           
    
 denotes the quarter-on-quarter credit growth, while    
    
 and      
    
 
captures the current and previous share of total credit accrued to non-financial corporations.
 The measurement used for the growth of credit to mortgages is the same as the one for 
non-financial corporations and is defined as following: 
 
          
         
          
     
 
 
Where           
     denotes the quarter-on-quarter credit growth, while    
     and      
     
captures the current and previous share of total credit accrued to the mortgage sector.   
 Overall credit growth is used as an observable variable and is measured in the same 
manner as for the sectorial credit growth. The credit growth for Norway is given by: 
 
                           
   
 
 
Where            denote the quarter-on-quarter credit growth for Norway, while      and 
       captures the current and previous credit rates, respectively.   
   is a measurement error 
term that follows an AR(1) process   
           
      
   , where            and the error 
term is   
         
  
  
  .         
 The measurement used for the Euro area GDP growth rate is the same as the one used 
for GDP growth for Norway and is given by: 
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Where          
   denote the quarter-on-quarter GDP growth, while   
   and     
   captures the 
current and previous GDP rates for the Euro area, respectively.    
 Then turning to the remaining observables I will in the following define and explain 
the real-interest rates used for non-financial corporations and households as well as the 
lending spreads for each sector.         
 In line with the rational expectations hypothesis, agents, in our case non-financial 
corporations, make decisions based on the real-interest rate (i.e. taking into account expected 
inflation). It was therefore important to define these variables. The real-interest rate for non-
financial corporations’ is given by:  
 
  
    
 =  
              
 
 
Where   
    
 represent the real-interest rate for the sector as a whole, and   
    
 is the nominal 
interest rate demanded. Lastly,          captures the expected CPI inflation one period ahead 
given the available information about the state variables at time t.     
 The real-interest rate for mortgages is included for the same reason as above and is 
defined as the following: 
 
  
     =  
              
 
 
Where   
     represent the real-interest rate for mortgage, and   
     is the nominal interest 
rate demanded, while          captures the expected CPI inflation one period ahead.
 Lending spread for non-financial corporations are the difference between the real-
interest rates demanded for borrowing credit and the risk-free real-interest rate. The lending 
spread is denoted as the following: 
 
       
        
        
 
 
Where        
    
 is the lending spread, and   
     is the real-interest rate for the sector as a 
whole, while    is the general real-interest rate.      
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 Lending spread for mortgages is defined in the same manner as for non-financial 
corporations and is given by:  
 
       
        
         
 
 
Where        
     is the lending spread, and   
     is the real-interest rate for mortgages, 
while    is the risk-free real-interest rate.  
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4 Data and Priors 
In order to estimate the stochastic properties of the exogenous driving forces I employ 
Bayesian methods, using quarterly Norwegian data over the sample period 1992:1-2010:4. I 
used 17 observables in the estimation. These observables are per-capita real quarter on quarter 
growth for GDP, domestic credit to the general public, domestic credit to households, and 
domestic credit to non-financial enterprises. Three inflation rates are used, namely the CPI, 
domestic and imported inflation, and three different interest rates are used, namely the interest 
rate on credit to households, the interest rate on credit to firms, and the nominal 3-month 
money market rate. The real exchange rate for Norway over this period is included. In 
addition, two different delinquency indexes are used for non-financial corporations and 
household mortgages, respectively.
24
 Numbers from the Norwegian banks’ equity ratios is 
used. And lastly, three Euro Area variables are utilized, i.e. EA GDP growth, EA inflation and 
the 3 month EA nominal interest rate. All variables are expressed and percentage deviation 
from their mean.          
 As for the prior distributions I adopted the following commonly used selection 
strategy for their shape. For the standard deviation of the shocks I adopted an inverse gamma 
distribution for its positive domain. For those parameters restricted between 0 and 1 I selected 
either a beta distribution or a uniform distribution. The remaining parameters are assumed to 
be normally distributed. The mean of the prior distributions are selected fairly easily for some 
very standard parameters (e.g. as’ and bs’), while I draw from Peñaloza’s estimations for the 
less known parameters (e.g. µs’ and γs’) (Peñaloza, 2011).       
 I provide an evaluation of the open economy DSGE model’s empirical properties to 
validate the model ﬁt; these results are provided in figures 3-5 below. The model fit shows 
that the stylized DSGE model seems to underestimate slightly the standard deviation and the 
autocorrelation of output when the model is simulated a large number of times. Nevertheless, 
the overall impression remains that the model fits the data reasonably well.   
 
                                                 
 
24
 Delinquency indexes used by Peñaloza (2011) is the adjusted delinquency indexes, which are the sum of 
overdue loans and loans written-off in the prior twelve months divided by total loans plus loans written-off in the 
last twelve months. I follow Peñaloza in the construction of the delinquency indexes for Norway. The data for 
constructing the delinquency indexes used in this paper was kindly provided by the Norges Bank.  
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4.1 Bayesian Estimation 
Bayesian estimation is easy to conceptualize, but is technically very intensive. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to provide a detailed description of the procedure and as such I will in the 
following outline the basic concepts and leave the more in-depth technically aspects of the 
procedure to be found in, among others, An and Schorfheide (2007) and Canova (2007). 
Nevertheless, given the scientific nature of this work it is also necessary to report a fair 
minimum amount of technical details for which I draw from Gelain and Kulikov (2009). 
 The Bayesian technique allows the researcher first to use prior information from 
earlier studies at both macro and micro level in a formal way, and then to supplement or 
confront the model with data.
 25
 Priors can be regarded as weights on the likelihood function 
that gives certain areas of the parameter subspace a greater weight. The Bayesian technique 
starts out with Bayes’ formula assuming that both data and parameters are random variables 
given by:26  
 
        
           
    
               
 
(15) 
Where Y is a set of observable data over a sample period, M is the model and θ is a set of the 
model parameters. According to Gelain and Kulikov (2009) “Bayesian statistics can be 
viewed as a learning process,” where observed data collected in Y is used to learn about the 
posterior distribution       of a k-dimensional vector of model parameters 𝜭, given the 
likelihood function        and the prior distribution     . The combination of the prior and 
the likelihood function is maximized and scaled by marginal data density to yield the 
posterior mode       . The Kalman filter is needed because the endogenous variables of 
the model involve certain quantities for which no observable counterparts can be found in 
macro-economic statistics. With this posterior mode, I employ computationally intensive 
Monte-Carlo method (Sampling algorithm based on Metropolis-Hastings) to generate   draws 
and produce posterior distribution of parameters. Bayesian estimation process in this paper is 
programmed in Dynare on Matlab. Figure 2 provides a general overview of the steps involved 
in the construction of the likelihood function for a typical DSGE model. Independent prior 
                                                 
 
25
 See the application of Bayesian estimation on a comprehensive DSGE model in Gelain and Kulikov (2009). 
26
 Where      ∫            
  
   can be treated as a normalizing constant for the purpose of posterior 
inference. 
26 
 
densities are formulated for 75 parameters of the model, namely, 22 autoregressive 
coefficients, 18 main structural parameters for the core model, 17 banking block related 
parameters and 18 parameters of the data-generating processes for the disturbances. Table 1- 
4  in the appendix reports the prior means, the posterior means and the 5 per cent and 95 per 
cent bounds for each of these parameters. The statistical estimates of the main structural 
parameters are largely in line with previous studies for Norway.
27
 
 
Figure 2: Bayesian estimation process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
27
 See Brubakk et al. (2006). 
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Figure 3: Fitted and Actual Values
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Source: Norges Bank 
 
                                                 
 
28
 Actual data (blue line) and corresponding one-step ahead linear Kalman filter forecasts evaluated at the 
posterior mode (light-blue line). 
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Figure 4: Fitted and Actual Values 
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Figure 5: Fitted and Actual Values 
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5 Model Response to Structural Shocks 
In this section, I study the model properties of the estimated Norwegian DSGE model by 
conducting an impulse response analysis. Impulse-response functions show how an initial 
shock propagates through the model economy, and how the main macroeconomic aggregates 
respond over time to different shocks. All impulse-response functions are based on the mode 
of the posterior distributions of all parameters. I will first present the monetary policy shock 
to validate the model fit in order to be confident in the evaluation of shocks such as the CAR 
shock.  The final simulation exercise examines responses to a permanent structural shock 
arising from a permanent one per cent increase in the capital adequacy ratio.  
 
5.1 Impulse-response functions 
Figure 6 show the dynamic responses of the impulse functions to a one standard deviation in 
the monetary policy shock and the capital adequacy ratio shock, respectively. I will treat the 
shock as a one-time disturbance which hits the model economy in a single period. In this way 
I am able to highlight how the economy’s reaction to the shock will generate persistent 
deviations from trend even if the shock itself is purely temporary. Figure 6 show the impulse-
response functions for some of the endogenous variables in the model generated by a 
temporary increase in our monetary policy shock variable, while Figure 7 show the impulse-
response functions responding to an exogenous tightening of regulatory policy for selected 
variables. See appendix for an overview of the responses of all the variables used in the 
model. The solid line represents the estimated response, with the dashed lines capturing the 
corresponding 95 per cent confidence interval. The scale on the horizontal axis measures the 
number of quarters after the initial shock       
 I first evaluate the monetary policy shock shown in figures 6. I study the effect of a 
one standard deviation shock to the Taylor rule on the Norwegian economy. This is 
equivalent to evaluating an increase of 25 basis points in the key policy rate. The effect on 
output, depicted in the top left graph of figure 6, is negative. The graph displays a 
characteristic hump-shaped pattern, reaching a trough after four quarters at 0.55 percentage 
points below its original level before slowly reverting back to its baseline level. This effect 
seems somewhat large for Norway given previous empirical evidence, but it is still in line 
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with it.
29
 The extra effect comes from the accelerator effect due to the presence of credit 
market imperfections in the model. The increase in the spread caused by the recession puts an 
extra burden on firms and households debts, forcing them to reduce investments and 
consumption respectively, which in turn further depresses the economy. In an estimated 
version with no financial friction the impact is 0.4 per cent. Inflation also reacts negatively 
because of the recession induced increase in interest rate. Again the 0.015 per cent drop is in 
line with previous empirical evidence for Norway. Real exchange rate is also falling by about 
1 per cent.           
 The results above allow me to be confident about the dynamic properties of the model 
and in judging the effects of a transitory shock to the banks’ capital adequacy ratio, which are 
displayed in figure 7. I report a one standard deviation shock for the sake of comparison with 
other studies, among others, Jacobsen et al. (2011). I will discuss here a shock of the 
magnitude of 1 per cent rather than of 0.4 per cent as in the figure.
30
 The shock is propagated 
via the banking sector in the model. Banks in the model respond to the temporary increase in 
their equity ratio by predominantly increasing lending spreads. The effect of a 1 per cent 
increase of banks’ capital requirement on output is negative, with a drop of 0.5 per cent at its 
peak reached after four quarters. This is somewhat in line with the findings in Jacobsen et al. 
(2011) when they employ the alternative model called the Small Macro Model.
31
 Credit seems 
to follow a somehow similar pattern responding by a small initial drop from baseline by -0.3 
percentage point, followed by a continuing movement away from the original level in the 
subsequent quarters, reaching a trough in the sixth quarter at -1.54 percentage point before 
gradually progressing back to its initial steady-state. The deviation of output from its initial 
level reflects a drop in economic activity due to an increased debt burden that distorts 
resources away from demand and productive use, and a slowdown in credit attributable to 
both a reduction in the debt-servicing capacity of both non-financial corporations and 
households and from higher delinquency indexes stemming from non-performing loans and 
loan losses. 
           
                                                 
 
29
 The impulse responses for the main macroeconomic aggregates seems to be fairly similar to the once 
presented in an article describing the “Norwegian Economy Model” (NEMO) used by Norges Bank (Brubakk et 
al. (2006)). 
30
 “To obtain the 1 per cent effect I simply multiply all impulse response functions by 2.5” 
31
 Used for stress testing analysis within Norges Bank according to the appendix in Jacobsen et al. (2011).      
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions Results
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions Results (CAR shock)
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 Impulse response functions expressed in percentage deviations from the steady states to one standard 
deviation orthogonalized innovation to   
  . 
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 Impulse response functions expressed in percentage deviations from the steady states to one standard deviation 
orthogonalized innovation to       
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5.2 Macroeconomic Implications of a Permanent Shock  
The impact of the policy shock also differs according to different degrees of persistence of the 
shock. The more persistent it is, the greater the impact it will have on the endogenous 
variables and the longer the system takes to return to its equilibrium. Since a persistent policy 
shock displaces the policy variable from its steady state and consequently displaces other 
variables from their respective steady state, I will in the following set the autoregressive 
coefficient in the equation for the capital adequacy ratio disturbance term equal to 0.99 (this 
coefficient was different for the temporary shock shown in figure 7), keeping all the 
remaining parameters set to the mode of posterior distributions. This is almost equivalent to a 
permanent increase of the capital adequacy ratio. Evaluating the response functions depicted 
in figure 8, following a close to “permanent shock” to the capital adequacy ratio equation, 
suggests that the estimated medium-term impact of raising the capital adequacy ratio by one 
per cent on GDP growth is in the interval of -0.50 and -0.55 percentage points below its 
steady-state level. It is also worth noting that an increase in the lending spread while reducing 
the level of output seems to leave its trend rate of growth unaffected. Despite the increase 
in lending spreads and the decrease in the supply of bank loans, following a permanent 
structural shock from the capital adequacy ratio disturbance term, the impact on growth will 
most likely be transitory; this line of reasoning is in line with the assumption made in the 
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MAG report. This is because when banks become less risky both the cost and quantity of 
credit should recover, reversing the impact on consumption and investment.  
 
Figure.8 Response of Output to a permanent structural shock 
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6 The Countercyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III 
This section analyzes the countercyclical capital buffer proposed by the new regulatory 
framework. The purpose of this section is to study the buffer using the macroeconomic 
framework developed above. As pointed out by Repullo and Saurina (2011) there are some 
issues related to the choice of a reference point to guide the building of the buffer. In 
particular it turns out that the BCBS proposal, aimed at trying to solve the pro-cyclicality 
problem of the entire regulation, might work in the opposite direction if the common 
reference point recommended, namely the credit-to-GDP gap, is uncritically chosen as the 
default reference point. A simple correlation analysis can show where the problem arises and 
Repullo and Saurina (2011) conduct such an exercise for a number of countries. Hence, I will 
first state the problem as highlighted in Repullo and Saurina (2011) then I will evaluate the 
issue using Norwegian data. Finally, I will analyze and evaluate the use of two different 
common reference points in the macroeconomic model.         
 The main rationale behind the use of a countercyclical capital buffer as noted by 
Repullo and Saurina (2011) is that “since capital is more expensive than retail deposits and 
other forms of funding, inducing banks to hold more capital during good times will help to 
moderate credit growth. The countercyclical buffer can be regarded as a supplementary 
instrument used by national authorities to mitigate the potential for the real economy to be 
affected by shocks that originate from within the financial sector itself. Thus, the regulatory 
authority will, using the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio as a common reference point, 
request banks to extend their capital conservation buffer, ranging from zero to 2.5 per cent of 
risk-weighted assets, in times of excessive credit growth.
34
 In order to make the rule both 
predictable and reliable, national authorities will pre-announce the decision to raise the level 
of the buffer by up to 12 months ahead, while the decision to release the buffer will have an 
immediate effect (BCBS, 2010c). Whereas the use of the countercyclical capital buffer itself 
is appreciated, the use of a common reference point for making buffer decisions has come 
under greater scrutiny by Repullo and Saurina (2011).  The first sub-section will review some 
of their main arguments succeeded by an investigation of the relevance of their findings for 
                                                 
 
34
 When the ratio of private credit accelerates well above its established trend for a sustained period, the 
likelihood of substantial credit losses and even a financial crisis increases (M Drehmann, C Borio, L 
Gambacorta, G Jimenez and C Trucharte, “Countercyclical capital buffers: exploring options”, BIS Working 
Papers, no 317, July 2010). 
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Norway. In sub-section 6.2 I will analyze the effects on the model economy when the 
countercyclical capital buffer based on two different “common reference points” is taken into 
account. The equation used to evaluate the effects on the model economy closely captures the 
proposed methodology provided in the Basel III document (BCBS, 2010c).   
6.1 Credit-to-GDP Gap as a Common Reference Point? 
The use of a countercyclical capital buffer is a noteworthy macroprudential element of the 
Basel III framework. However, a recent paper by Repullo and Saurina (2011) shows that the 
key macroeconomic variable on which it is based, the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
with respect to its trend is negatively correlated with GDP growth for many countries.
35
 The 
main findings from their study suggest that “the variable chosen by the Basel Committee as 
common reference point for taking buffer decisions may end up exacerbating the inherent pro-
cyclicality of risk-sensitive bank capital.”36 They argue instead, based on a study conducted 
by Jordà et.al (2010), that the use of real credit growth as a leading indicator provides a better 
alternative for assessing systemic-wide-risk. Despite the fact that real credit growth lags the 
business cycle they provide data confirming a positive correlation between real credit growth 
and output growth for all the countries used in their sample.      
 In line with the findings of Repullo and Saurina (2011) I have in the following 
reproduced the case in question in order to explore the validity and relevance for Norway. 
Calculating the correlation between output growth and bank capital for the period 1982-2009 
for Norway suggests that there is a small positive correlation of 0.0599. It should be noted 
that correlations are very sensitive to the choice of sample period. Thus, the slight positive 
correlation could plausibly be explained by the inclusion of the years Norway experienced a 
banking crisis. Computing the credit-to-GDP gap for the same period as above and then 
plotting this with the GDP growth rate gives us the graph below in figure 9. It is evident from 
the graph that the two variables in question are negatively correlated. This suggests that a 
mechanical application of a rule based on the credit-to-GDP gap would distort the main 
objective of Basel III because it signals to increase the countercyclical capital buffer when 
                                                 
 
35
 Correlations where computed for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and US showing an average correlation 
of -0.17 across countries. 
36
 Using UK as an illustrative example they show that when GDP growth is low the credit-to-GDP gap tends to 
be high, and vice versa. 
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GDP growth is low and to reduce it when GDP growth is high. Computing the deviations of 
real credit growth with respect to a long-run average using a GDP-deflator for the sample 
period, and plotting this with output growth provides us the graph in figure 10. A closer look 
at figure 10 suggests that real credit growth follows the business cycle with a lag, but more 
closely than the credit-to-GDP gap. Calculating the correlation between the two variables 
demonstrate a positive correlation of 0.45. These findings suggest that an uncritical use of a 
common reference point can lead to results that are detrimental to the principal objective of 
the Basel III regulatory framework. Thus, the aim of the subsequent section is to investigate 
the properties of the model economy when a countercyclical capital buffer is included.  
 
Figure.9 Credit-to-GDP gap and GDP growth, Norway, 1982-2010 
 
 Source: Norges Bank 
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Figure.10 Real credit growth and GDP growth, Norway, 1982-2010 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
6.2 The countercyclical capital buffer applied  
The BCBS has in a guidance document for national authorities outlined a methodology for 
operating the countercyclical capital buffer with the objective as stated “to use a buffer of 
capital to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from 
periods of excess aggregate credit growth that have been associated with the build-up of 
system-wide risk.” In the same document they further stress that “Authorities in each 
jurisdiction are free to emphasize any other variables and qualitative information that make 
sense to them for purposes of assessing the sustainability of credit growth and the level of 
system-wide risk, as well as in taking and explaining buffer decisions. This includes 
constructing additional credit/GDP or other guides that are more closely aligned to the 
behavior of their financial systems” (BCBS, 2010c). The methodology provided in the annex 
of the guidance document has been conceptualized and further defined by Repullo and 
Saurina (2011) and can be summarized as follows:
37
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 The notations used are different from their paper so as not to contradict with previously used notations.   
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Where    is defined as the deviation of the aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP ratio from 
its trend.    describes the aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP ratio, while    denote the 
Hodrick-Prescott trend of    and is computed using a smoothing parameter λ = 400,000 
(Repullo and Saurina, 2011).         
 With this in mind, the benchmark countercyclical capital buffer,   , are advised by the 
guidance document to be set according to the following rule:   
 
         
{
 
 
 
 
                                                       
     
   
                                    
                                                           
 
 
 
Where   and   denote a lower and upper bound for the gap (BCBS, 2010c).38 The following 
graph illustrates the mechanical properties of the countercyclical buffer: 
Figure.11 The relationship between the countercyclical capital buffer and the credit-to-GDP gap 
 
 
                                                 
 
38
 The BCBS guidance document has argued, based on their own analysis, that an “adjustment factor on L = 2 
and H = 10 provides a reasonable and robust specification based on historical banking crisis” (BCBS, 2010c).    
   
   
2.5 
L H 
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The methodology provided in the BCBS guidance document and rationalized by Repullo and 
Saurina (2011) is first and foremost a “rule” based approach to making buffer decisions. The 
methodology as such is not well-suited to be directly incorporated into the stylized DSGE 
model used in this paper. As a consequence, I have constructed two equations so as to make 
the countercyclical capital buffer a continuous approximation of the methodology outlined 
above. The equations provided capture in a suitable manner the properties of the methodology 
when used as a function of a common reference point, be it the credit-to-GDP gap or the real 
credit growth. These equations (when used separately as a rule in the capital adequacy ratio 
equation (14) in the banking sector block) alter the properties of the main model and generate 
some noteworthy results.          
6.2.1 Equation for the Rule using Credit-to-GDP Gap 
It turns out that the use of an equation specified as following seems to adequately capture the 
properties outlined in figure 11: 
 
  =                   
 
(16) 
Where    denote the buffer, while         represents a normal cumulative distribution 
function. The variable used for the credit-to-GDP gap   is defined in section 3. Using values 
for credit-to-GDP simulated from the estimated model with all the parameters set at the mode 
of their posterior distributions I obtain values for the buffer. These two quantities are plotted 
against each other in figure 12. The figure provided suggests that the equation bear a 
resemblance to the graph by Repullo and Saurina (2011) in figure 11.         
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Figure.12 Buffer response to Credit-to-GDP Gap 
 
 
6.2.2 Equation for the Rule using Real Credit Growth 
The following equation is defined in the similar way as the one above (i.e. with a normal 
cumulative distribution function), however with different number values and with the use of a 
real-credit growth as a common reference point instead. 
 
  =                          
 
(17) 
Plugging in values for the real-credit growth from the estimated model simulated as explained 
above. The implied dynamics for the buffer is as in figure 13. According to our though the 
banking sector should start building up their capital buffer when the real-credit growth 
exceeds 0.5 per cent. After that limit they should keep increasing the buffer until the value of 
the buffer reaches its maximum level at 2.5. In the figure provided the buffer increases above 
this level, however, it is worth noting that the historical average for the real-credit growth has 
been around 2 per cent and the maximum growth was at 3.8 per cent. 
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Figure.13 Buffer Response to Real Credit Growth 
 
 
6.3 The modified methodology applied and evaluated 
The previous section provided two different rules to investigate the dynamic properties of the 
capital buffer. In this section I want to evaluate the result attained from a direct application of 
the two equations into the model economy.         
 The correlation between output growth and bank capital without a buffer in the model 
is 0.14. Using equation (16) in the estimated model seems to reduce the volatility of credit by 
reducing the standard deviation from 1.85 to 1.51. However it increases the volatility of 
output, increasing the standard deviation from a level of 1.16 to 1.48. Additionally, and more 
essentially, it alters the sign of the correlation between output growth and bank capital 
producing a strong negative correlation of -0.61. When using equation (17) instead, where the 
reference point for making buffer decisions is the real credit growth, I was, in addition to 
reducing both the volatility of credit growth and output growth, also able to increase the 
magnitude of the correlation between output growth and bank capital by generating a positive 
correlation of 0.22. These results are clearly supporting the use of real credit growth, partly 
because it dampens excessive fluctuations in both credit and output, but mainly, and more 
importantly, because it seems to produce results that are more aligned with the objectives of 
Basel III.   
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7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have studied the impact of higher capital requirements, which are both part 
and parcel of the newly proposed regulatory framework of Basel III, using an estimated 
semi-structural new Keynesian small open economy model for Norway. The proposed 
regulatory framework is assumed to make the financial system more robust and safer, 
though, not entirely without repercussions to the banking sector in particular and the real 
economy in general. Imposing banks to increase their capital to risk-weighted-assets ratio 
will, by raising funding costs, affect banking sector profitability. The regulatory 
framework is from the bank’s viewpoint restricting asset expansion  and from a broader 
viewpoint increasing the cost and reducing the quantity of credit. The paper has argued in 
line with the arguments found in the MAG report that the immediate response by the 
banking industry to higher capital requirements will be to increase their  lending spreads 
(so as to keep their return on equity constant). The main component reducing aggregate 
demand and output in the model is higher lending spreads.     
 Despite the use of reduced-form equations, the model properties, when evaluated 
for model-fit (studying impulse responses following a monetary policy shock), seems to 
adequately capture structural features of the Norwegian economy. The main finding, 
studying the impulse response function, suggest that the effect of a one per cent increase 
of banks’ capital requirement on output is negative, with a drop of 0.5 per cent at its peak 
reached after 4 quarters. Studying the same shock for credit in the model shows that 
credit responds by a small initial drop from baseline by -0.3 percentage point, followed 
by a continuing movement away from the original level in the subsequent quarters, 
reaching a trough in the sixth quarter at -1.54 percentage point before gradually 
progressing back to its initial steady-state. The effect of a permanent increase of one per 
cent in the capital adequacy ratio shows that GDP growth shifts by -0.50 to -0.55 
percentage points below its initial steady-state level following a shock. The initial shock 
seems to displace the level of output, but the trend growth rate seems to be unaffected. 
 A second question highlighted in the introduction and addressed separately in this 
paper is the use of a countercyclical capital buffer to mitigate the inherent pro-cyclical 
feature of minimum capital requirement. Studying the model properties, both before and 
after the inclusion of a countercyclical capital buffer, clearly suggests that credit 
volatility is reduced, but not the volatility of output, when credit-to-GDP gap is used as a 
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common reference point. It also creates a strong negative correlation of -0.61 between 
output growth and bank capital in the model. The use of real credit growth on the other 
hand shows some desirable properties. Next to reducing both the variance of credit and 
output (standard deviation of credit goes down from 1.85 to 1.71 and the standard 
deviation for output growth reduced from 1.16 to 1.13) it produces a positive correlation 
of 0.22 between output growth and bank capital. These results highlight that real credit 
growth used as an indicator and as a decision variable not only is more aligned with the 
core objectives of the new capital regulatory framework of Basel III but also with the 
behavior of the Norwegian financial system.           
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Appendix 
Table 1: The prior and posterior distributions of the Norwegian DSGE model parameters 
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution 
Std of shocks; 
Norway 
 type mean Std. 
deviation 
mean Std. 
deviation 
10% 90% 
    
 I.G 0.20   0.1616 0.0169 0.1334 0.1893 
     I.G 0.20   0.4574 0.0573 0.3601 0.5533 
     I.G 0.20   1.1072 0.1193 0.8627 1.3339 
 
  
   I.G 0.20   0.2420 0.0242 0.2034 0.2780 
 
  
            I.G 0.20   0.2425 0.0241 0.2048 0.2781 
 
  
           
 I.G 0.20   0.2438 0.0245 0.2066 0.2801 
 
  
        I.G 0.20   2.3605 0.2119 2.0199 2.7045 
 
  
       
 I.G 0.20   1.3902 0.1245 1.1876 1.5884 
 
  
      
 I.G 0.20   0.4247 0.040 0.3621 0.4846 
 
  
     I.G 0.20   0.3887 0.0348 0.3330 0.4430 
 
  
   I.G 0.20   0.6076 0.0579 0.5177 0.6967 
 
  
       I.G 0.20   0.5368 0.0633 0.4532 0.6169 
 
  
           I.G 0.20   0.9004 0.0870 0.7671 1.0405 
 
  
          
 I.G 0.20   0.1862 0.1828 0.0459 0.3516 
Std of shocks; 
Foreign 
        
 
  
   I.G 0.20   0.5162 0.0437 0.4436 0.5888 
    
 I.G 0.20   0.2236 0.0193 0.1934 0.2531 
    
 I.G 0.20   0.2285 0.0204 0.1952 0.2596 
    
 I.G 0.20   0.1377 0.0169 0.1122 0.1614 
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Table 2: The prior and posterior distributions of the Norwegian DSGE model parameters 
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution 
AR coeff; 
Norway 
 type mean Std. 
deviation 
mean Std. 
deviation 
10% 90% 
    Beta 0.50 0.10 0.130 0.0379 0.0735 0.1836 
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.7647 0.0640 0.6654 0.8655 
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.7107 0.0433 0.5820 0.8383 
                              Beta 0.50 0.10 0.1243 0.0465 0.0711 0.1778 
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.7575 0.0646 0.6618 0.8601 
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6893 0.0595 0.5498 0.8318 
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.2879 0.0579 0.1707 0.3991 
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.4498 0.0458 0.3204 0.5708 
    Beta 0.50 0.10 0.5043 0.0563 0.3728 0.6303 
    Beta 0.50 0.10 0.4217 0.0722 0.2862 0.5586 
                         Beta 0.50 0.10 0.3372 0.0676 0.2221 0.4464 
                        Beta 0.50 0.10 0.2722 0.0454 0.1645 0.3720 
              Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6894 0.0662 0.5852 0.7957 
  
          
  Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6417 0.0573 0.5344 0.7486 
          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6490 0.0679 0.4624 0.8349 
  
      
  Beta 0.50 0.10 0.7486 0.1198 0.5982 0.9035 
                         Beta 0.50 0.10 0.2992 0.0678 0.1851 0.4088 
       Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6477 0.0488 0.4751 0.8102 
     Beta 0.50 0.10 0.2846 0.0687 0.1777 0.3909 
                                Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6983 0.0504 0.5788 0.8244 
                             Beta 0.50 0.10 0.5642 0.0521 0.4117 0.7091 
                           Beta 0.50 0.10 0.5116 0.0852 0.3617 0.6652 
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Table 3: The prior and posterior distributions of the Norwegian DSGE model parameters 
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution 
Core model 
parameters 
 type mean Std. 
deviation 
mean Std. 
deviation 
10% 90% 
    Normal 0.41 0.05 0.2760 0.0286 0.2051 0.3483 
      Normal 0.58 0.05 0.4509 0.0316 0.3763 0.5286 
                            Normal 0.05 0.005 0.0411 0.0025 0.0331 0.0488 
                            Normal 0.03 0.005 0.0233 0.0028 0.0162 0.0305 
    Normal 0.41 0.05 0.3406 0.0562 0.2832 0.40 
    Normal 0.58 0.05 0.5179 0.0401 0.4550 0.5834 
    Normal 0.20 0.05 0.1815 0.0492 0.1079 0.2558 
                            Normal 0.03 0.05 0.1508 0.0069 0.1336 0.1688 
                             Normal 0.03 0.005 0.0334 0.0289 0.0128 0.0543 
    Normal 0.016 0.005 0.1863 0.2267 0.0308 0.3305 
    Normal 0.50 0.05 0.4552 0.0214 0.4011 0.5113 
                             Normal 0.50 0.05 0.4755 0.0458 0.4225 0.538 
                            Normal 0.50 0.05 0.4755 0.0415 0.3880 0.5583 
    Normal 0.125 0.01 0.1270 0.0086 0.1119 0.1426 
                              Beta 0.50 0.10 0.8622 0.0262 0.8187 0.9060 
Identities; 
Norway  
        
    Uniform 0 1 0.1697 0.1359 0.0034 0.3348 
    Uniform 0 1 0.1118 0.0738 0.0028 0.2174 
         Uniform 0 1 0.2918 0.0356 0.2378 0.3474 
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Table 4: The prior and posterior distributions of the Norwegian DSGE model parameters 
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution 
Banking block 
parameters 
 type mean Std. 
deviation 
mean Std. 
deviation 
10% 90% 
   
    
                           Beta 0.50 0.10 0.3730 0.0626 0.2428 0.4981 
   
    
                                           Normal 0.02 0.005 0.3277 0.0657 0.2391 0.4217 
   
    
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.3869 0.1205 0.2675 0.5095 
   
    
                           Normal 0.02 0.005 0.2756 0.0374 0.1924 0.3627 
   
    
                           Beta  0.50 0.10 0.7751 0.0646 0.6518 0.9030 
   
    
                           Normal 0.14 0.001 0.6809 0.0703 0.523 0.8362 
   
    
                          Normal 0.08 0.005 0.3091 0.070 0.1870 0.4334 
   
    
       Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6704 0.0768 0.4985 0.8505 
   
    
                         Normal 0.014 0.001 0.7201 0.067 0.5577 0.8796 
   
    
                         Normal 0.08 0.005 0.3945 0.0539 0.2751 0.5181 
    Beta 0.50 0.10 0.5875 0.0571 0.4162 0.7680 
   
    
                         Normal 0.05 0.008 0.1232 0.0101 0.1077 0.1386 
   
    
                         Normal 0.05 0.008 0.1476 0.0083 0.1324 0.1633 
   
    
                          Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6712 0.0558 0.5624 0.7758 
   
    
                         Normal 0.05 0.008 0.4499 0.0760 0.3230 0.5810 
   
      Beta 0.50 0.10 0.6706 0.050 0.5484 0.7876 
   
    
                        Normal 0.05 0.008 0.3016 0.1101 0.1985 0.4016 
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Figure 14: Impulse Response Functions Results
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Figure 15: Impulse Response Functions Results (Monetary policy shock) 
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Figure 16: Impulse Response Functions Results (CAR shock)
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Figure 17: Impulse Response Functions Results (CAR shock) 
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